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Abstract 
This paper empirically evaluates the treatment effect of consistent pegs (i.e., the policy that countries 
claim to have pegged regimes and actually adopt the announced pegged regimes) on the occurrence 
of currency crises to examine whether consistent pegs are indeed more prone to currency crises than 
other regimes. To estimate the treatment effect of consistent pegs properly, we must carefully control 
for the self-selection problem of regime adoption because a country's exchange rate regime choice is 
non-random. We thus use matching estimators as a control for the self-selection problem. We find 
interesting and robust evidence that consistent pegs significantly decrease the probability of currency 
crises compared with other exchange rate policies. 
JEL classification: F31; F33 





It is well known that several countries' actual (de/acto) exchange rate regimes are inconsistent 
with their official (de jure) exchange rate regimes (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002; Reinhart and Rogoff, 
2004; Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 2005). For example, Calvo and Reinhart (2002) suggest that, in 
reality, many countries that claim to have floating regimes actively manage their exchange rate. 
According to Alesina and Wagner (2006), because a large depreciation (or devaluation) of an 
exchange rate makes market participants recognize that such countries are vulnerable in terms of 
monetary and exchange rate regimes, many countries try to actively manage the exchange rate to 
avoid such situations even if they claim to have floating regimes. Therefore, many countries 
strategically (or are forced to) follow regimes that differ from their announced regimes. 
It is often claimed that announcing the adoption of pegged regimes increases the risk of 
currency crises because official pegs may become targets of speculative attacks (e.g., Levy-Yeyati 
and Sturzenegger, 2005; Genberg and Swoboda, 2005). However, countries with consistent pegs (i.e., 
the policy that countries claim to have pegged regimes and actually adopt the announced pegged 
regimes) may avoid speculative attacks because they can enhance the credibility of their currencies 
by following through on their commitments to adopt pegged regimes. In a world with increasingly 
integrated capital markets, are consistent pegs really prone to speCUlative attacks and currency crises, 
as is commonly assumed? The purpose of this paper is to answer this question. 
According to Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005), to avoid speculative attacks, many 
countries adopt pegged regimes but they do not claim to have pegged regimes when they want to 
stabilize their currencies. Alesina and Wagner (2006) call this behavior "fear of announcing a peg." 1 
Is this policy effective? Are there significant differences in the probability of currency crises 
between the policy of adopting regimes different from the announced regimes and that of actually 
adopting the announced regimes? 2 These questions must be addressed to evaluate the actual 
exchange rate policies. However, there is little empirical literature investigating the links between 
actual regimes, announced regimes and the occurrence of currency crises.3 The focus of this paper is 
I While Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) call this behavior "fear of pegging," Alesina and Wagner 
(2006) call it "fear of announcing a peg." In this paper, following Alesina and Wagner (2006), we call it 
"fear of announcing a peg." 
2 The links between deviations of actual exchange rate regimes from announced ones and economic 
performance have been analyzed, for example, by Carrera and Vuletin (2003) (real effective exchange 
rate volatility), Bastourre and Garrera (2004) (volatility of economic growth), and Dubas et al. (2005) 
(economic growth). 
3 In a related paper, Genberg and Swoboda (2005) compare the distribution of monthly exchange rate 
changes for countries that adopt a "fear of announcing a peg" policy versus countries with consistent pegs 
from 1974 to 2001 using data from the IMF classification and the de facto Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) 
classification. According to their analysis, average exchange rate changes are lower for countries with 
consistent pegs than for countries with a "fear of announcing a peg" policy, but the standard deviation is 
higher for countries with consistent pegs than for countries with a "fear of announcing a peg" policy. 
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addressing this research gap. 
Some empirical studies have investigated the links between exchange rate regimes and 
currency crises using various datasets and methods (e.g., Ghosh et aI., 2003; Bubula and Otker-Robe, 
2003; Husain et aI., 2005; Haile and Pozo, 2006; Coulibaly, 2009; Esaka, 2010). However, these 
previous studies provide a mixed view of the effect of exchange rate regimes on the occurrence of 
currency crises. Therefore, it is very useful to determine which types of exchange rate regimes are 
more susceptible to speculative attacks and currency crises and which exchange rate regimes can 
avoid currency crises. As Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) point out, if many countries 
strategically follow actual regimes different from their announced regimes to avoid speculative 
attacks, an examination of whether deviations of actual exchange rate regimes from announced 
regimes affect the occurrence of currency crises will provide useful information. 
Accordingly, this paper empirically evaluates the effect of consistent pegs on the occurrence of 
currency crises to examine whether countries with consistent pegs have significantly higher or lower 
probabilities of currency crises compared with other exchange rate policies. In doing so, we 
investigate whether the deviations of actual exchange rate regimes from the announced regimes 
affect the occurrence of currency crises. We use the relationship between the de jure IMF 
classification and the de facto Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) classification as an indicator of 
discrepancy or consistency between announced and actual regimes. 
To properly estimate the effect of exchange rate regimes on the incidence of currency crises, 
we must carefully control for the self-selection problem of regime adoption. Previous studies (cited 
above) do not explicitly address this problem. In the estimation of these studies, self-selection bias 
can arise because a country's exchange rate regime choice is non-random (i.e., there are systematic 
differences between countries that do and do not adopt a specific regime). This issue suggests that 
previous studies may provide an inaccurate picture of the effect of exchange rate regimes on the 
occurrence of currency crises. 
In this paper, we employ the bias-corrected matching estimator of Abadie and Imbens (2006) 
to address the self-selection problem of regime adoption. Abadie and Imbens (2006) show that the 
simple matching estimator will be biased in finite samples because matching is not exact when the 
matching variables are continuous. To remove this bias, they propose the bias-corrected matching 
estimator, which adjusts for differences in covariate values within the matches. Abadie and Imbens 
(2011) find that, in the simulation study, the bias-corrected matching estimator performs well 
compared with both simple matching estimators without the bias-adjustment and regression-based 
estimators in terms of bias and mean-squared error. In addition, we apply propensity score matching 
to test the robustness of the results from the matching method of Abadie and Imbens (2006). To our 
Moreover, countries with consistent pegs often experience extreme changes in their exchange rates. 
Therefore, Genberg and Swoboda (2005) suggest that committing to pegged regimes increases the risk of 
speculative attacks. However, they did not conduct a formal statistical analysis. 
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knowledge, no other paper investigates the effect of consistent pegs on the occurrence of currency 
crises using matching methods.4 
The central concept of matching methods is matching each treated unit with control units that 
have similar observed characteristics and then comparing the outcomes between the treated and the 
control units. The advantage of matching methods is that they can formally control for the 
non-random selection problem and avoid the specification of the functional form because they are 
nonparametric techniques (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002; Imbens, 2004; Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009). 
The matching techniques can avoid selection bias and provide unbiased estimates of treatment 
effects (Imbens, 2004; Abadie and Imbens, 2006; Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009). 
Using matching estimators, we estimate the average treatment effect of consistent pegs on the 
likelihood of currency crises to examine whether consistent pegs are actually more vulnerable to 
currency crises than other exchange rate policies. We find interesting evidence that consistent pegs 
significantly decrease the likelihood of currency crises compared with other exchange rate policies. 
This result is robust to a wide variety of matching methods. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data of currency crises and de jure 
and de Jacto exchange rate regimes. Section 3 explains significant exchange rate policies that 
indicate discrepancies between announced regimes and actual regimes. Section 4 presents an 
empirical methodology for matching methods. Section 5 estimates the average treatment effect of 
consistent pegs on the risk of currency crises using matching methods. Section 6 empirically 
examines our hypotheses. Finally, Section 7 presents a summary and concluding remarks. 
2. Data 
This section presents the data on currency crises and the classifications of de jure and de Jacto 
exchange rate regimes used in this paper. Our sample consists of 84 countries from 1980-1998.5 
2.1. Currency crisis data 
The data on currency crisis episodes are obtained from Esaka (2010).6 Following previous 
studies of currency crises (e.g., Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; Glick and Hutchison, 2005; Hong and 
Tomell, 2005), the exchange market pressure index (EMPI) is employed to identify currency crisis 
episodes. The EMPI is constructed from a weighted average of real exchange rate changes and 
4 To our knowledge, no other paper investigates the links between deviations between actual and 
announced exchange rate regimes and economic performances using matching methods. 
5 We excluded the following from the sample: some small countries, Middle Eastern countries, transition 
economies, and other countries with incomplete data. Moreover, we excluded the United States and 
Germany because these countries act as references for most of the countries in the sample. 
6 For additional details regarding the method of identifying currency crises, see Esaka (2010). 
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foreign reserves changes.? Both successful and unsuccessful speculative attacks on the currencies 
can be captured by applying this index. Esaka (2010) defines a currency crisis as having occurred 
when the EMPI for a country meets either of the following two conditions: (1) the EMPI is above the 
mean plus two times the standard deviation and the EMPI is above 10% or (2) the EMPI is above 
50%.8 Here, we construct the currency crisis dummy variable, which takes a value of one if the 
country experiences a currency crisis in a particular year and zero otherwise. Following the 
treatment effect literature, the currency crisis dummy is defined as the outcome variable. 
Following Glick and Hutchison (2005), we use a two-year window following the onset of a 
crisis and eliminate any observations within two years of each crisis from our dataset to reduce the 
chances of capturing the continuation of the same currency crisis. Using a two-year window allows 
us to investigate the causality from exchange rate regimes to currency crises, because the reverse 
causality from crises to exchange rate regimes can be mitigated by eliminating two-year 
observations following the onset of a crisis from our dataset. The selected currency crisis episodes 
are shown in Appendix A. The 84 countries in our sample experienced 154 currency crises from 
1980 to 1998.9 
2.2. Classifications of exchange rate regimes 
In this paper, we use the de jure IMF classification as the announced (or official) exchange 
rate regimes and the de facto Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) classification as the actual exchange rate 
regimes to examine whether consistent pegs are really more prone to currency crises than other 
regimes. 
2.2.1. The de jure IMF classification 
Before 1998, the IMF's official classification system classified IMF member countries on the 
basis of their own official statements regarding the degree of exchange rate flexibility. Regimes were 
mainly classified into three categories: (1) peg (i.e., pegged to a single currency or a composite of 
currencies), (2) limited flexibility, and (3) more flexible, which included managed floating and 
independently floating. However, it is well known that the actual, de facto exchange rate regimes of 
several countries were inconsistent with their official, de jure exchange rate regimes (Calvo and 
Reinhart, 2002; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004; Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 2005). 
To correct this shortcoming, the IMF has adopted a new classification system based on the IMF 
? As in Hong and Tomell (2005), Esaka (20 I 0) uses the real exchange rate to avoid counting continuous 
high inflation rates as crises. 
8 As for previous studies of currency crises (e.g., Glick and Hutchison, 2005), the threshold values of the 
EMPI are also adjusted by employing some means. 
9 We compare these crisis episodes with those of previous studies and do not find any crucial differences. 
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members' de facto regimes since January 1999.10 The new IMF system classifies member countries 
into eight categories: (1) exchange arrangements with no separate legal tender, including formal 
dollarization and currency unions, (2) currency boards, (3) other conventional fixed pegs, (4) pegged 
exchange rates within horizontal bands, (5) crawling pegs, (6) exchange rates within crawling bands, 
(7) managed floating with no predetermined path for the exchange rate, and (8) independently 
floating. The data from the old and new IMF classifications can be obtained from the IMF's Annual 
Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). 
For the purpose of this paper, we classify de jure exchange rate regimes into two categories: 
(1) "pegs" and (2) "floats." Following Genberg and Swoboda (2005), we thus define the first and 
second old IMF categories as (1) "pegs" and the third old IMF category as (2) "floats." Because the 
IMF has adopted a new classification system based on IMF members' de facto regimes since 1999, 
we cannot treat the IMF's classification data after 1999 as announced exchange rate regimes. 
Therefore, we use the years from 1980 to 1998. 
2.2.2. The de facto Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) classification 
In this paper, we use the de facto classification of Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) as data 
indicating the actual exchange rate regimes. Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) construct a historical 
database of the de facto exchange rate regimes for 153 countries from 1946 to 2001. They classify 
exchange rate regimes by applying detailed country chronologies and a broad variety of descriptive 
statistics on official and market-determined (dual and parallel) exchange rates. 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) classify countries into fourteen categories: (1) no separate legal 
tender, (2) pre-announced peg or currency board arrangement, (3) pre-announced horizontal band 
that is narrower than or equal to +/-2%, (4) de facto peg, (5) pre-announced crawling peg, (6) 
pre-announced crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2%, (7) de facto crawling peg, (8) 
pre-announced crawling band that is wider than or equal to +/-2%, (9) de facto crawling band that is 
narrower than or equal to +/-2%, (10) de facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-5%, 
(11) moving band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2%, (12) managed floating, (13) freely floating, 
and (14) freely falling. II 
The first feature of Reinhart and Rogoff's classification is the creation of a new separate 
category for a country with a twelve-month rate of inflation above 40%. Such a country is classified 
as "freely falling." Thus, it is possible to precisely capture the relationship between exchange rate 
regimes and performances using the "freely falling" category. 
For the purposes of this paper, we classify de facto exchange rate regimes into three 
10 For more details of the JMF new classification system, see Bubula and btker-Robe (2002). 
11 The Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) classification data were obtained from 
http://www.puafumd.edu/Jacu/ty/papers/reinhart/papers.hlm. 
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categories: (1) "pegs," (2) "floats," and (3) "freely faIIing.,,12 Following Genberg and Swoboda 
(2005), we thus define the first through ninth Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) categories as "pegs," the 
tenth through thirteenth categories as "floats," and the fourteenth category as "freely falling." Note 
that in Reinhart and Rogoff's (2004) framework, categories (1) through (9) correspond to a peg (Le., 
pegged to a single currency or a composite of currencies) and thus to "limited flexibility" in terms of 
the IMF classification, while categories (10) through (13) correspond to "more flexible" (i.e., 
managed floating and independently floating) in terms of the IMF classification. 
As in Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), Bubula and btker-Robe (2002) and Levy-Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger (2005) provide data on de facto exchange rate regimes. These classifications have their 
own merits, but the Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) classification is more appropriate for our purposes. 
First, we use the Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) data because they construct the database of de facto 
regimes for many countries over a long period. Given that Bubula and btker-Robe (2002) construct 
a database on de facto regimes from 1990 to 2001 following the new IMF classification system, they 
do not provide useable data before 1990. Although Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) classify 
exchange rate regimes from 1974 to 2000, their sample contains many cases in which de facto 
regimes are not identified for any year, especially in developing countries. 
Second, because Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) treat high-inflation countries as another category 
(freely faIling), we can use their data to separately consider the situation in which high-inflation 
countries have a high probability of currency crises. Thus, we can precisely capture the probability 
that a country that adopts a specific exchange rate regime will experience a currency crisis. Third, 
because Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) provide a relatively longer duration of exchange rate regime as 
compared with other de facto data (Husain et aI., 2005), we can use their data to examine the impact 
of relatively long-lived exchange rate regimes on currency crises. 
3. Deviations of actual regimes from announced regimes and currency crises 
In this section, we first explain important aspects of exchange rate policies that indicate the 
relationship between announced regimes and actual regimes. Next, we formulate some hypotheses 
regarding how deviations of actual regimes from announced ones affect the occurrence of currency 
crises. 
3.1. Exchange rate policies and the difference between announced regimes and actual regimes 
Figure 1 shows the differences and similarities between announced regimes and actual regimes, 
including the following exchange rate policies. First, the "fear of announcing a peg" policy (i.e., 
12 When we attempted to further subdivide exchange rate regimes, the resulting categories did not have a 
sufficient number of observations to statistically examine the link between the deviations between actual 
and announced regimes and currency crises. 
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Regime 2) is defined as a policy in which countries actually adopt pegged regimes but do not claim 
to have pegged regimes (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 2005; Alesina and Wagner, 2006). Second, 
the "fear of pegging" policy is defined as a policy in which countries actually adopt floating regimes 
but claim to have pegged regimes, and the "inability of pegging" situation is defined as a situation in 
which countries cannot maintain announced pegged regimes (Alesina and Wagner, 2006). Regime 3 
is treated as the "fear of pegging" or "inability of pegging" because these situations cannot be clearly 
distinguished from the data. Third, the "consistent" policy is defined as a policy in which countries 
actually adopt the announced regimes (Carrera and Vuletin, 2003). For example, the "consistent 
pegs" policy (i.e., Regime 1) is defined as a policy that consistently maintains announced pegged 
regimes, while the "consistent floats" policy (i.e., Regime 4) is defined as a policy that consistently 
maintains announced floating regimes. 13 
[Insert Figure 1 approximately here] 
3.2. Our hypotheses 
Let us now develop the following hypotheses to examine the link between the 
above-mentioned exchange rate policies and currency crises. 
3.2.1. Consistent pegs vs. other exchange rate policies 
It is often claimed that actually adopting announced pegged regimes encourages capital 
inflows that are more excessive than those of other policies and that this policy is susceptible to 
sharp capital flow reversals induced by shocks. Moreover, the exchange rate policy may become a 
target of speculative attacks. Therefore, we hypothesize that countries with consistent pegs have a 
significantly higher risk of currency crises than countries with other policies. 
However, countries that consistently maintain a commitment to pegged regimes can enhance 
greater credibility in their currencies by requiring increased macroeconomic policy discipline and 
maintaining stricter rules for exchange policies compared with other polices. Therefore, we 
hypothesize that countries with consistent pegs have a significantly lower risk of currency crises than 
those with other policies due to this policy's capacity to enhance credibility. To determine which 
hypothesis is correct, we statistically examine whether a policy of consistent pegs significantly 
increases or decreases the probability of currency crises compared with other policies. 
\3 For example, before the European currency crisis in 1992-1993, Italy, Spain, and Sweden adopted 
consistent pegs, while Norway adopted a "fear of pegging" policy (i.e., Regime 3). Before the Mexican 
currency crisis in 1994-1995, Mexico adopted a "fear of announcing a peg" policy (i.e., Regime 2). 
Before the Asian currency crisis in 1997-1998, Indonesia, Korea, and Malaysia had a "fear of announcing 
a peg" policy (i.e., Regime 2), while Thailand had consistent pegs. For Australia, which adopted 
consistent floats, the currency crisis occurred in 1985. 
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3.2.2. Consistent pegs vs. fear of announcing a peg 
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) point out that many countries try to avoid explicit 
commitments to pegged regimes even if they actually adopt pegged regimes because official pegs 
may become targets of speculative attacks. Therefore, many countries that actually adopt pegged 
regimes do not announce these regimes to avoid speculative attacks. If this policy is indeed 
appropriate, countries with a "fear of announcing a peg" policy (i.e., Regime 2) will have a 
significantly lower probability of currency crises than countries with consistent pegs (i.e., Regime 
1 ). 
As discussed by Alesina and Wagner (2006), because deviations of actual regimes from 
announced regimes are likely to imply increased uncertainty in the exchange rate policy, these 
situations essentially affect the credibility of an exchange rate regime. Therefore, countries that 
actually adopt announced pegged regimes may avoid speculative attacks because they can enhance 
credibility in their currencies by upholding their commitments to adopt pegged regimes. If this 
policy is indeed effective, countries with consistent pegs (i.e., Regime 1) will have a significantly 
lower probability of currency crises than countries with a "fear of announcing a peg" policy (i.e., 
Regime 2). The question is which of these dynamics is actually observed in the data. Thus, we 
statistically verify whether there is a significant difference between the probability of crises for 
countries with a "fear of announcing a peg" policy and countries that adopt consistent pegs. 
3.2.3. Consistent pegs vs. fear of pegging (or inability of pegging) 
Because situations in which countries fear pegging or are unable to peg allow market 
participants to perceive vulnerabilities in monetary and exchange rate regimes, such countries lose 
market credibility in their currencies (Alesina and Wagner, 2006). Therefore, we hypothesize that 
countries that cannot peg or fear pegging (Le., Regime 3) have a substantially higher probability of 
currency crises than countries with consistent pegs (i.e., Regime 1). 
3.2.4. Consistent pegs vs. consistent floats 
As mentioned above, it is often claimed that one of the major ingredients of the environment 
leading to currency crises is consistent pegs. Consistent pegs may promote excess capital inflows by 
minimizing the exchange rate risk for international investors. Therefore, we hypothesize that 
countries with consistent pegs have a significantly higher risk of currency crises than countries with 
consistent floats. 
However, consistent pegs may enhance credibility in their currencies by requiring increased 
macroeconomic policy discipline and maintaining stricter, clearer rules for exchange policies 
compared with consistent floats. Therefore, we hypothesize that countries with consistent pegs have 
a significantly lower risk of currency crises than consistent floats. To determine which hypothesis is 
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correct, we statistically examine whether a policy of consistent pegs significantly increases or 
decreases the probability of currency crises compared with consistent floats. 
4. Empirical methodology 
This paper formally controls for the self-selection problem of regime adoption to properly 
estimate the effect of consistent pegs on the occurrence of currency crises. Following the treatment 
effect literature, we refer to the adoption of consistent pegs as "treatment," the country (observation) 
with consistent pegs (i.e., Regime 1) as the "treatment group," and the country (observation) with 
other regimes (i.e., Regime 2, Regime 3, and Regime 4) as the "control group." We also define the 
occurrence of currency crises (i.e., currency crisis dummy) as the "outcome" variable. 14 
To address the self-selection problem of regime adoption, we employ the matching methods 
recently developed in the microeconometric evaluation studies. ls Matching methods have been 
widely used in labor and health economics (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009). In the fields of 
macroeconomics and international economics, matching methods have recently been used to conduct 
policy evaluation. For example, using propensity score matching methods, Persson (2001) examines 
the effect of currency unions on international trade; Lin and Ye (2007) conduct a policy evaluation of 
inflation targeting; Glick et al. (2006) investigate the effect of capital account liberalization on the 
frequency of currency crises; and Lin and Ye (2010) evaluate the effect of dollarization on 
international trade. Using covariate matching methods, Baier and Bergstrand (2009) examine the 
effect of free trade agreements on international trade. The advantage of the matching methods is that 
they can eliminate sample selection bias by formally controlling for the non-random selection 
problem and avoid the specification of the functional form because they are nonparametric 
techniques (Imbens, 2004; Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009). 
Following the treatment effect literature/6 we estimate the average treatment effect on the 
treated (ATT) to examine the effect of consistent pegs on currency crises. We thus consider the 
following equation: 
ATT = E[YJ1) I T; = 1] - E[Y; (0) I ~ = 1], (1) 
14 Both continuous and discrete scalar variables can be applied as the outcome variable in the estimation 
of the average treatment effect (Abadie et aI., 2004). 
15 We note that instrumental variable method is not appropriate for addressing the self-selection bias in 
this paper because it is very difficult to find suitable instrumental variables for regime choice that are not 
also correlated with the occurrence of currency crises and instrumental variable method requires the 
specification of the functional form. 
1 The presentation in the rest of this section is partly based on the theory and empirical application of 
matching methods by Heckman et ai. (1998), Imbens (2004), Abadie and Imbens (2006), Lin and Ye 
(2007), Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008), and Imbens and Wooldridge (2009). 
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where T is the dummy variable of the treatment (T = 1 when treated and T = 0 when not 
treated); 1';(1) and Yj (0) denote the potential outcomes: 1';(1) is the outcome when unit i adopts 
the treatment (e.g., consistent pegs) and Yj (0) is the outcome when unit i does not adopt the 
treatment. 17 The fundamental problem in estimating the ATT is that the second term on the 
right-hand side (Y, (0) I Tj = 1) is not observable, while the first term (Y, (1) I Tj = 1) is observable. 
That is, the key point is identifying the counterfactual for E[Y,(O) IT; = 1] . 
If the treatment decision (i.e., the regime choice) is random, the ATT can be estimated using 
the sample mean of the outcome for the control group (E[Yj (0) I Tj = 0]). However, this method can 
generate biased estimates because the regime choice is not random in this analysis. In the estimation 
of the ATT, self-selection bias arises when the treatment decision is systematically correlated with a 
set of observable covariates that also affect the outcome (Imbens, 2004; Caliendo and Kopeinig, 
2008; Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009). 
To identify the second term on the right-hand side of equation (1), first, the conditional 
independence assumption (unconfoundedness assumption) is needed as 
(2) 
This assumption implies that given pre-treatment variables or covariates X, the treatment assignment 
is independent ofthe potential outcomes. Therefore, for units with similar values of X, the treatment 
assignment is random with respect to the potential outcomes. Second, the common support condition 
(overlap condition) is needed asl8 
(3) 
where P(Tj = 11 X j ) is the conditional probability of adopting the treatment given observed 
covariates X. This probability is the so-called "propensity score." This condition requires the 
existence of some comparable control units for each treatment unit. 
Under the conditional independence assumption and the common support condition, Equation 
(1) can be rewritten as 
(4) 
17 In this analysis, only one of the potential outcomes is observed for each unit i, and the other is 
unobserved or missing. The unobserved outcome is called the counterfactual outcome. The matching 
estimators impute the missing potential outcome using average outcomes for units with similar values of 
covariates (Abadie et aI., 2004). 
18 According to Heckman et al. (1998), we need only to assume that Y;(O) J. T; I Xj (unconfoundedness 
for controls) and P(T; = 11 Xj) < 1 (weak overlap) to identify the ATT. 
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where E[1', (0) I Ti = 1, Xi] is replaced with E[1', (0) I ~ = 0, Xi] for observed control units. The 
covariate matching method matches treatment units to control units with similar observed values of 
covariates X. The matching can establish a credible counterfactual to properly estimate the average 
treatment effect by matching each treatment unit to control units with similar covariates (Imbens and 
Wooldridge, 2009). 
Abadie and Imbens (2006) show that the simple covariate matching estimator will be biased in 
finite samples because matching is not exact when the matching variables are continuous. To remove 
the bias, they develop the bias-corrected matching estimator, which adjusts for difference within the 
matches for the differences in covariate values. This estimator combines matching, which compares 
each treated observation with control observations with similar values of covariates, and regression, 
which reduces remaining biases due to covariate imbalances (Abadie and Imbens, 2011). For details 
of the bias-corrected matching estimator used in this paper, see Appendix C. Abadie and Imbens 
(2011) find that, in the simulation study, the bias-corrected matching estimator of Abadie and Imbens 
(2006) performs well in terms of bias, root-mean-squared error, and coverage rates compared with 
both simple matching estimators and regression estimators. 
We thus apply the bias-corrected matching estimator proposed by Abadie and Imbens (2006) 
to precisely estimate the average treatment effect of consistent pegs on currency crises.19 Following 
Abadie et al. (2004), we use the weighted Euclidean vector norm to measure the distance between 
different values of the matching variables. Abadie et al. (2004) suggest that, in simulations, using 
four matches performs well in terms of mean-squared error for the matching estimator of Abadie and 
Imbens (2006). Following the recommendation of Abadie et al. (2004), we use four matches in this 
analysis. 
In this paper, we examine the link between exchange rate policies at time t-l and currency 
crises at time t, taking into account the causality of time series. According to Imbens (2004) and 
Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008), observed pre-treatment variables (pre-treatment characteristics) 
should be used as matching variables. For the treatment at time t-1, we thus use a set of covariates at 
time t-2. 
According to Imbens (2004) and Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008), observed pre-treatment 
variables (covariates) should be chosen based on economic theory and previous empirical findings. 
Referring to previous studies of the determinants of the exchange rate regime choice (e.g., Juhn and 
Mauro, 2002; Alesina and Wagner, 2006/° and currency crises (e.g., Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; 
19 Abadie and Imbens (2006) employ matching with replacement, allowing each control unit to be used 
as a match more than once. Matching with replacement increases the average quality of matching by 
increasing the set of possible matches (Abadie and Imbens, 2006). 
20 Juhn and Mauro (2002) review previous empirical studies for the determinants of exchange rate regime 
choice. They suggest that the sign and the significance of the coefficients of explanatory variables 
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Glick and Hutchison, 2005), we first choose the following matching variables: the log ratio of broad 
money to foreign reserves, domestic credit growth, the current account-to-GDP ratio, real exchange 
rate overvaluation,21 the ratio of foreign liabilities to money, and real GDP growth.22 We then 
estimate the average treatment effect of consistent pegs on the frequency of currency crises by 
calculating the mean difference in outcomes between the treatment and the control observations 
using the bias-corrected matching estimators. 
Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) and Crump et aI. (2009) point out that the estimation of the 
average treatment effect is often hampered by a lack of covariate overlap (overlap condition). This 
lack of overlap can lead to imprecise estimates. To address the lack of overlap, Crump et aI. (2009) 
accordingly propose the simple rule of thumb of discarding all units (observations) with estimated 
propensity scores outside the range [0.1, 0.9]. In numerical simulations, they prove that the average 
treatment effect can be estimated most precisely using this technique. Following Crump et aI. (2009), 
we first trim the sample by discarding observations with the estimated propensity scores (Le., the 
estimated probability of adopting consistent pegs from probit models) outside the range [0.1,0.9] 
and then estimate the average treatment effects of consistent pegs on currency crises using the 
covariate matching of Abadie and Imbens (2006). 
5. The treatment effect of consistent pegs on currency crises 
In this section, we estimate the average treatment effect of consistent pegs on the incidence of 
currency crises using the bias-corrected matching estimator of Abadie and Imbens (2006) to examine 
whether consistent pegs significantly increase or decrease the probability of currency crises 
compared with other regimes. Before proceeding, we present the frequency of currency crises at / by 
each exchange rate regime at /-1. Table 1 shows that the probability of currency crises is lower for 
consistent pegs (7.9 %) than for other regimes (10.9 %). It is also observed that the probability of 
currency crises is lower for consistent pegs than for a "fear of announcing a peg" policy (8.7%), fear 
pegging or are unable to peg (12.2%), and consistent floats (13.2%). Therefore, we find that 
consistent pegs are likely to be less vulnerable to currency crises than other regimes. 
substantially change depending on the sample of countries, the sample period, the methodology, and the 
model specification. Therefore, we do not present a detailed argument regarding the sign and the 
significance of covariates in this paper. 
21 Following previous studies, real exchange rate overvaluation was calculated as follows. First, we 
estimated a simple linear regression of the real exchange rate on a constant term and a time trend. Next, 
we defined the difference between the estimated fitted value and the real exchange rate as the real 
exchange rate overvaluation. 
22 At the same time, considering the balancing property, we choose the above-mentioned matching 
variables. These variables are constructed using the data from the IMF, International Financial Statistics 
CD-ROM and the World Bank, World Development Indicators CD-ROM. 
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[Insert Table 1 approximately here] 
5.1. Results of the bias-corrected matching estimator: Benchmark 
Table 2 presents the results from estimating the average treatment effects of consistent pegs on 
the occurrence of currency crises using the bias-corrected matching estimator of Abadie and Imbens 
(2006).23 For matching methods, the common support condition (overlap condition) is imposed and 
the freely falling observations are excluded. The numbers in parentheses are 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors?4 
From the benchmark in column (1) of Table 2, we note that the average treatment effect is 
significantly negative at the 1 % level, indicating that consistent pegs significantly decrease the 
incidence of currency crises compared with other regimes.25 The estimated average treatment effect 
of consistent pegs is -0.067, suggesting that consistent pegs are associated with a 6.7% decrease in 
the likelihood of currency crises relative to other regimes. According to the probability of currency 
crises in Table 1, consistent pegs have a 3.0% (=10.9-7.9) lower probability of currency crises 
compared with other regimes. Therefore, the effect of consistent pegs on currency crises for the 
matching technique is larger, on the order of 6.7%. The treatment effect of consistent pegs is strongly 
significant and economically meaningful for covariate matching methods. 
Therefore, after controlling for self-selection bias, consistent pegs have a significant economic 
effect on lowering the occurrence of currency crises. That is, when two countries have similar values 
of covariates, and when one country adopts consistent pegs and the other does not, the country with 
consistent pegs is substantially less prone to currency crises. 
Our finding is in contrast to the conventional policy wisdom that consistent pegs are prone to 
currency crises. However, consistent pegs may enhance the credibility of their currencies by 
sustaining their commitment to pegged regimes and requiring increased macroeconomic policy 
discipline. Therefore, it can be surmised that, although consistently following a commitment to 
pegged regimes may become targets of speculative attacks, countries that maintain announced 
pegged regimes are substantially less prone to speculative attacks compared with other regimes. 
[Insert Table 2 approximately here] 
5.2. Robustness: Additional matching variables 
We conduct several robustness checks. First, we estimate the average treatment effects using 
23 Matching estimates are obtained using the Stata ado-file of Abadie et a1. (2004). 
24 Abadie and Imbens (2008) show that, in the simulation study, the analytic standard errors of Abadie 
and Imbens (2006) work well even in fairly small samples. 
25 Many variables (e.g., domestic credit growth, the current account-to-GDP ratio, and real GDP growth) 
that may influence both the regime choice and the occurrence of currency crises are included as matching 
variables in the benchmark estimations. 
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additional matching variables. Von Hagen and Zhou (2005) show that capital account liberalization 
affects the choice of exchange rate regime. Glick and Hutchison (2005) and Glick et al. (2006) find 
that countries with capital controls have a significantly higher likelihood of currency crises than 
countries with no capital controls. Therefore, capital account liberalization may influence both 
regime choice and the occurrence of currency crises. We thus add the dummy for capital account 
liberalization26to the baseline matching variables in the case of "adding 1 variable" in Table 2. 
The political system and level of development may also affect the choice of exchange rate 
regime (Juhn and Mauro, 2002). We thus add the typology of the political system by Beck et al. 
(2001) and the logarithm of GDP per capita to the matching variables. In the case of "adding 3 
variables" in Table 2, these three variables (including the dummy for capital account liberalization) 
are added to the baseline matching variables. From columns (2) and (3), we note that the average 
treatment effects of consistent pegs are significantly negative, indicating that consistent pegs have a 
significantly lower likelihood of currency crises compared with other regimes. Therefore, we obtain 
substantially the same result as the benchmark. 
5.3. Robustness: Alternative common support condition 
Second, we estimate the average treatment effects with and without imposing the common 
support condition. We use the alternative common support condition of Becker and Ichino (2002), 
while the common support condition of Crump et al. (2009) is applied in the benchmark. Following 
the implementation of Becker and Ichino (2002), we exclude control observations whose estimated 
probability of adopting consistent pegs (from probit models) are lower than the lowest probability 
among the treatment observations or higher than the highest probability among the treatment 
observations. From the case of the common support condition of Becker and Ichino (2002) in 
columns (4)-(6) and no common support condition in columns (7)-(9), we note that the average 
treatment effects of consistent pegs are significantly negative for all cases. Therefore, even after 
using the alternative common support condition, we obtain essentially the same result as the 
benchmark. 
5.4. Robustness: Alternative number o/matches 
Third, we use the alternative number of matches to estimate the average treatment effects of 
consistent pegs, while we use four matches in the benchmark following the recommendation of 
26 Following Glick and Hutchison (2005), we construct the dummy for capital account liberalization on 
the basis of the IMF's AREAER. As a robustness check, we also estimate the average treatment effects by 
imposing the exact matching of the dummy for capital account liberalization. This analysis forcibly 
matches each treatment observation with control observations within the same condition of capital 
account liberalization. The average treatment effects are significantly negative at the 1 % level, while the 
detailed results are omitted to save space. Therefore, we obtain substantially the same results as in 
columns (2) and (3) of Table 2. 
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Abadie et al. (2004). We use one match in columns (10)-(12) and eight matches in column (13)-(15). 
From columns (10)-(15) of Table 2, we note that the average treatment effects of consistent pegs are 
significantly negative for all case. Therefore, our results remain essentially the same as the 
benchmark despite changing the number of matches. 
5.5. Robustness: Comparisons within the same year 
Fourth, we estimate the average treatment effects by including year dummies as matching 
variables. In this analysis, we perform exact matching on year dummies to force that the 
comparisons of the treated observations (i.e., consistent pegs) and the control observations (i.e., 
other regimes) are done within the same year period?7 From columns (16)-(18) of Table 2, we note 
that the average treatment effects of consistent pegs are significantly negative for all case. Therefore, 
our qualitative results remain essentially the same even when comparing consistent pegs with other 
regimes within the same year period. 
In addition, we apply propensity score matching methods to test the robustness of the results 
from the matching method of Abadie and Imbens (2006). For more details of the propensity score 
matching method, see Appendix B. From columns (1)-(3) of Appendix Table B, we note that the 
average treatment effects of consistent pegs are significantly negative, indicating that consistent pegs 
significantly decrease the incidence of currency crises compared with other regimes. Therefore, for 
propensity score matching, we obtain substantially the same results as the matching estimator of 
Abadie and Imbens (2006). 
6. Empirical examination of our hypotheses 
To examine our hypotheses presented in sub-section 3.2, we select the following sub-samples: 
(1) de facto pegs, (2) de jure pegs, and (3) consistent pegs and consistent floats. 
6.1. Consistent pegs vs. fear of announcing a peg 
We first select the dataset of de facto pegs to examine whether countries with consistent pegs 
have a significantly higher or lower probability of currency crises compared with countries with a 
"fear of announcing a peg" policy. Table 3 shows the estimated average treatment effects using the 
bias-corrected matching estimator when the dataset of de facto pegs is used. We refer to the 
observation with consistent pegs as the treatment group and to the observation with "fear of 
announcing a peg" as the control group. 
From the benchmark in column (1) of Table 3, we note that the average treatment effect is 
27 In addition to the above-mentioned, to control for the contagious effects of currency crises and the 
common shocks in the world, we include year dummies as matching variables. 
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significantly negative, indicating that consistent pegs significantly decrease the incidence of 
currency crises compared with a "fear of announcing a peg" policy. The estimated average treatment 
effect of consistent pegs is -0.047, suggesting that consistent pegs lower the likelihood of currency 
crises by 4.7% relative to "fear of announcing a peg." 
We conduct several robustness checks, as in Section 5. From Table 3, we note that the average 
treatment effects of consistent pegs are significantly negative for all cases. Therefore, we obtain 
qualitatively the same results as the benchmark estimation. Although Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 
(2005) report that many countries may actually adopt pegged regimes but not announce pegged 
regimes to avoid speculative attacks, a policy of consistently maintaining announced pegged regimes 
substantially decreases the risk of speculative attacks compared with a "fear of announcing a peg" 
policy. 
[Insert Table 3 approximately here] 
6.2. Consistent pegs vs.fear o/pegging (or inability o/pegging) 
Second, we select the dataset of de jure pegs to examine whether countries that cannot peg or 
fear pegging have a substantially higher probability of currency crises than countries with consistent 
pegs. Table 4 shows the estimated average treatment effects using the bias-corrected matching 
estimator when the dataset of de jure pegs is used. We refer to the observation with consistent pegs 
as the treatment group and to the observation with fear of pegging as the control group. 
From the benchmark in column (1) of Table 4, we note that the average treatment effect of 
consistent pegs is significantly negative, indicating that a fear or inability of pegging significantly 
increases the risk of currency crises compared with consistent pegs. The estimated average treatment 
effect is -0.080, suggesting that consistent pegs lower the likelihood of currency crises by 8.0% 
relative to a fear of pegging (an inability of pegging). As in Section 5, we conduct several robustness 
checks. From Table 4, we note that the average treatment effects of consistent pegs are significantly 
negative for all cases.28 Therefore, we obtain qualitatively the same results as the benchmark 
estimation. 
[Insert Table 4 approximately here] 
6.3. Consistent pegs vs. consistent floats 
Third, we select the dataset of consistent pegs and consistent floats to examine whether 
28 From the case of the common support condition of Becker and Ichino (2002) in columns (4)-(6) and no 
common support condition in columns (7)-(9), we observe that the average treatment effects change 
depending on the set of covariates. This result may occur because the alternative common support 
condition is inappropriate in this analysis. 
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consistent pegs significantly increase or decrease the probability of currency crises compared with 
consistent floats alone. Table 5 presents the results from estimating the average treatment effects 
using the dataset of consistent pegs and consistent floats. We refer to the observation with consistent 
pegs as the treatment group and to the observation with consistent floats as the control group. 
From the benchmark in column (1) of Table 5, we note that the average treatment effect is 
significantly negative, indicating that consistent pegs significantly decrease the incidence of 
currency crises compared with consistent floats. The estimated average treatment effect is -0.118, 
suggesting that consistent pegs lower the likelihood of currency crises by 11.8% relative to 
consistent floats. We conduct several robustness tests to verify the robustness of the result of the 
benchmark. From Table 5, we note that the average treatment effects of consistent pegs are 
significantly negative for all cases. Therefore, we obtain qualitatively the same results as the 
benchmark. 
Overall, while we examined our hypotheses and executed sensitive analyses when selecting 
datasets, we find that consistent pegs significantly decrease the probability of currency crises 
compared with other exchange rate policies. 
[Insert Table 5 approximately here] 
7. Summary and concluding remarks 
In this paper, we formally evaluate the treatment effect of consistent pegs on the occurrence of 
currency crises in 84 countries from 1980 to 1998. We carefully address the self-selection problem 
of regime choice that previous studies have not explicitly addressed. To address the self-selection 
problem, we employ the bias-corrected matching estimators of Abadie and Imbens (2006). 
Using matching estimators, we estimate the average treatment effect of consistent pegs on the 
incidence of currency crises. After controlling for self-selection bias, we find several interesting 
results. First, countries with consistent pegs have a significantly lower probability of currency crises 
than countries with other exchange rate policies. Second, countries with consistent pegs have a 
significantly lower probability of currency crises than those with a "fear of announcing a peg" policy. 
Third, countries with consistent pegs have a significantly lower probability of currency crises than 
those with a fear of pegging. Fourth, countries with consistent pegs have a significantly lower 
probability of currency crises than those with consistent floats. These results are robust to a wide 
variety of matching methods. 
Therefore, we statistically confirm that deviations of actual exchange rate regimes from 
announced regimes significantly affect the occurrence of currency crises. We can reasonably 
conclude that countries that consistently maintain announced pegged regimes are least prone to 
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speculative attacks and currency crises because they can enhance credibility in their currencies by 
sustaining their commitment to pegged regimes. 
Appendix A. Currency crises, 1980-1998 
Appendix Table A shows various currency crisis episodes from 1980 to 1998. The 84 countries 
experienced 154 currency crises from 1980 to 1998. 
[Insert Appendix Table A "Currency crises, 1980-1998" approximately here] 
Appendix B. Propensity score matching 
To test the robustness of the results from the matching method of Abadie and Imbens (2006), 
we employ some propensity score matching metbods.29 Following the implementation of propensity 
score matching (e.g., Dehejia and Wahba, 2002; Imbens, 2004; Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008), we 
perform the following procedure. In the first stage, we estimate the probability of adopting consistent 
pegs (propensity scores) using multinomial probit models. The dependent variable is the index of 
exchange rate regimes (Regime 1=1, Regime 2=2, Regime 3=3, and Regime 4=4). We use the same 
matching variables (the explanatory variables in probit models) as the benchmark of the 
bias-corrected matching estimators in Sections 5 and 6. 
In the second stage, we estimate the average treatment effect of consistent pegs on the 
frequency of currency crises by calculating the mean difference in outcomes between the treated and 
control observations using propensity score matching. In this paper, we employ nearest-neighbor and 
radius matching methods as propensity score matching methods. The nearest-neighbor matching 
technique (with replacement) matches each treated observation with the control observation that has 
the closest propensity score. The radius matching technique matches a treated observation to control 
observations with estimated propensity scores falling within specified radius r. We employ two 
radius matching estimators: r=0.01 and r=0.05. Following Crump et al. (2009), we use the 
observations of the interval [0.1, 0.9] for the estimated propensity scores as the common support 
condition (overlapping condition). 
Appendix Table B presents the estimated average treatment effects of consistent pegs when 
29 Propensity score matching methods were introduced and developed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) 
and have recently become very popular in the program evaluation literature. The advantage of propensity 
score matching is that this technique can overcome the high-dimension problem because matching is 
performed based on only the estimated propensity score from the probit model of several observables 
(Dehejia and Wahba, 2002). However, the reduction in dimensions may cause less precise matching 
(Imbens, 2004). 
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matching is carried out using the estimated propensity scores from multinomial probit models.3o The 
dataset of de facto pegs is selected in columns (4)-(6), the dataset of de jure pegs is selected in 
columns (7)-(9), and the dataset of consistent pegs and consistent floats is selected in columns 
(10)-(12). From Appendix Table B, we note that the average treatment effects of consistent pegs are 
significantly negative for all cases, except for column (4). This result indicates that consistent pegs 
significantly decrease the incidence of currency crises compared with other regimes. Therefore, for 
propensity score matching, we obtain substantially the same results as the matching method of 
Abadie and Imbens (2006). Overall, our results are robust to various matching techniques. 
[Insert Appendix Table B "Propensity score matching" approximately here] 
Appendix C. Bias-corrected matching estimator 
Following the notation and terminology of Abadie et al. (2004) and Abadie and Imbens (2006, 
2011), Appendix C presents the bias-corrected matching estimator for the average treatment effect on 
treated (ATT) in this paper. Let T; be a binary variable that indicates exposure of unit i to treatment, 
so T; = 1 if unit i was exposed to treatment and T; = 0 otherwise. For unit i, i = 1,"', N ,let 1';(1) 
and 1'; (0) denote the potential outcomes: 1'; (1) is the outcome of unit i when exposed to the 
treatment and Y; (0) is the outcome of unit i when not exposed to the treatment. There are N j 
treated units and No control units, N = No + N j • We are interested in estimating the ATT: 
'it = E[Y; (1) - 1'; (0) I T; = 1] . 
To identify and estimate the above ATT, we assume that assignment to treatment is 
independent of the potential outcomes, conditional on the covariates, and that the probability of 
assignment is bounded away from zero and one. That is, (1) the conditional independence 
assumption (unconfoundedness) and (2) the overlap condition (common support condition) are 
needed, as noted by Section 4. 
Abadie and Imbens (2006) consider the case of matching with replacement, allowing each 
control unit to be used as a match more than once. Matching with replacement increases the average 
quality of matching by increasing the set of possible matches. To measure the distance between 
different values of the covariates X, Abadie et al. (2004) use the weighted Euclidean vector norm (for 
x EX, let II xliv = (x' Vx) 11 2 be the vector norm with the positive definite weight matrix V being the 
30 Matching estimates are obtained using the Stata ado-file of Becker and !chino (2002). Because Abadie 
and Imbens (2008) show that standard errors obtained from bootstrapping are not valid for matching 
estimators, we thus calculate analytical standard errors of the average treatment effect. 
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diagonal matrix constructed from the inverses ofthe variances of each element of Xi ).31 
Let j m (i) be the index of the m-th match to unit i. That is, among the units in the opposite 
treatment group to unit i, unit j m (i) is the m-th closest unit to unit i in terms of the covariates, 
measured by the Euclidean distance between the two vectors. Let J M (i) = {j; (1), ... , j M (i)} denote 
the set of indices for the first M matches for unit i. Following Abadie et al. (2004), we use the four 
nearest neighbors (M = 4) in this paper. Let K M (i) denote the number of times unit i is used as a 
match if M matches are performed per unit, KM (i) = I:l1{i E J M (l)}, where l{.} is the indicator 
function. 
The simple matching estimator for the ATT imputes the missing potential outcomes Yi (0) 
(i.e., counterfactual) when T; = 1 using the average of the outcome of the nearest neighbors of the 
control group: 
For unit i in the treated sample, the expression in the second line of the above equation gives the 
average value of Yj for the matches to unit i in the control sample. Abadie and Imbens (2006) write 
the simple matching estimator for the ATT that uses M matches per unit with replacement as 
where N) is the number of treated units in the sample. 
Abadie and Imbens (2006) point out that the simple covariate matching estimator will be 
biased in finite samples because matching is not exact when the matching variables are continuous. 
They show that this matching estimator is not N 112 -consistent in general because it has a bias of 
order 0 p (N- II k) due to matching discrepancies, where k is the number of continuous covariates. 
To remove the bias, they propose a bias-corrected matching estimator, which adjusts for difference 
within the matches for the differences in covariate values. The adjustment is based on an estimate of 
the regression function PI (x) = E[Y(t) I X = xl for the control sample because we are interested in 
31 Abadie et al. (2004) define II z - x II v as the distance between the vector z and x, with V being the 
diagonal matrix constructed from the inverses of the variances of each element of the matching variables. 
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estimating the ATT.32 Given the estimated regression function for the controls, we predict the 
missing potential outcomes Yi (0) as 
where Po is a consistent estimator of ,uo (x) = E[Y(t) I X = x]. The term Po (Xi ) - Po(Xj ) in the 
second line of the above equation is used to adjust the counterfactual estimates to account for 
differences in the matching variables for each treatment observation (Xi) and its matched control 
observations (X j). The bias-corrected matching estimator for the ATT that uses M matches per unit 
with replacement is calculated as 
Abadie and Imbens (2006, 2011) show that the bias-corrected matching estimator is 
N l/2 -consistent and asymptotically normal regardless of the number of covariates. Abadie and 
Imbens (2011) find that, in the simulation study, the bias-corrected matching estimator performs well 
in terms of bias, root-mean-squared error, and coverage rates compared to both simple matching 
estimators and regression estimators. In this paper, we apply the bias-corrected matching estimator 
of Abadie and Imbens (2006) using the Stata ado-file of Abadie et al. (2004) to estimate the average 
treatment effect of consistent pegs on the occurrence of currency crises. 
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Table 1 
Exchange rate regimes and currency crises, 1980-1998 
Case Groups Regimes Regimes (t-I) Crises (t) Probability 
Number Number (%) 
Case 1 Treatment Regime 1 (consistent pegs) 596 47 7.9% 
Control Other regimes (except for freely falling) 686 75 10.9% 
Exclusion Freely falling 143 32 22.4% 
Total 1425 154 10.8% 
Case 2 Treatment Regime 1 (consistent pegs) 596 47 7.9% 
Control Regime 2 (fear of announcing a peg) 300 26 8.7% 
Control Regime 3 (fear of pegging) 197 24 12.2% 
Control Regime 4 (consistent floats) 189 25 13.2% 
Exclusion Freely falling 143 32 22.4% 
Total 1425 154 10.8% 
Table 2 
h Bias-corrected matching estimators: consistent pegs vs. ot er regimes 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Case Benchmark Robustness: adding variables Robustness: overlap condition of Becker and Ichino (2002) Robustness: no overlap condition 
Covariates Baseline Adding 1 variable Adding 3 variables Baseline Adding 1 variable Adding 3 variables Baseline Adding 1 variable Adding 3 variables 
Matching estimators Bias-corrected Bias-corrected Bias-corrected Bias-corrected Bias-corrected Bias-corrected Bias-corrected Bias-corrected Bias-corrected 
ATT -0.0665*** -0.0947*** -0.0755*** -0.0662*** -0.0913*** -0.0762*** -0.0729*** -0.0983*** -0.0761 *** 
SE (0.0229) (0.0239) (0.0223) (0.0220) (0.0229) (0.0215) (0.0223) (0.0236) (0.0207) 
Z-statistics -2.91 -3.96 -3.39 -3.01 -3.98 -3.54 -3.28 -4.16 -3.67 
Observations 869 869 858 901 901 879 926 926 909 
Number of matches 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Common support condition [0.1,0.9] [0.1,0.9] [0.1,0.9] [0.0314,0.9643] [0.0314,0.9642] [0.0459,0.9630] No No No 
(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
Case Robustness: number ofmatches=1 Robustness: number ofmatches=8 Robustness: including year dummies 
Covariates Baseline Adding 1 variable Adding 3 variables Baseline Adding 1 variable Adding 3 variables Baseline Adding 1 variable Adding 3 variables 
Matching estimators Bias-corrected Bias-corrected Bias-corrected Bias-corrected Bias-corrected Bias-corrected Bias-corrected Bias-corrected Bias-corrected 
ATT -0.0846*** -0.1078*** -0.1163*** -0.0653*** -0.0785*** -0.0625*** -0.0692*** -0.0768*** -0.0604*** 
SE (0.0254) (0.0277) (0.0341) (0.0214) (0.0220) (0.0198) (0.0226) (0.0238) (0.0215) 
Z-statistics -3.32 -3.89 -3.42 -3.05 -3.57 -3.15 -3.06 -3.22 -2.80 
Observations 869 869 858 869 869 858 869 868 850 
Number of matches 1 1 1 8 8 8 4 4 4 
Common support condition [0.1,0.9] [0.1,0.9] [0.1,0.9] [0.1,0.9] [0.1,0.9] [0.1,0.9] [0.1,0.9] [0.1,0.9] [0.1,0.9] 
Note: We refer to the observation with Regime 1 (i.e., consistent pegs) as the "treatment group" and to the observation with other regimes (except for freely falling) as the "control group." We employ the 
nearest-neighbor bias-corrected matching estimators of Abadie and Imbens (2006). Matching and bias-adjusted variables are the log ratio of broad money to foreign reserves, domestic credit growth, the ratio of foreign 
liabilities to money, the current account-to-GDP ratio, real GDP growth, and real exchange rate overvaluation. In the cases of "adding 1 variable," the dummy for the capital account liberalization is added to the 
baseline matching variables. In the cases of "adding 3 variables," the dummy for the capital account liberalization, the typology of the political system, and the logarithm of GDP per capita are added to the baseline 
matching variables. When including year dummies as matching variables in columns (16)-(18), we force that the comparisons of the treated observations and the control observations are done within the same year 
period. The freely falling observations are excluded. ATT is the average treatment effect on the treated. The numbers in parentheses are heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. 
*** Significant at the 1 % level. 
Table 3 
BO las-correcte d matc 109 estIma ors: consistent pegs VSo hO t f ear 0 announcmg a peg 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Case Benchmark Robustness: adding variables Robustness: overlap condition of Becker and Ichino (2002) Robustness: no overlap condition 
Covariates Baseline Adding 1 variable Adding 3 variables Baseline Adding 1 variable Adding 3 variables Baseline Adding 1 variable Adding 3 variables 
Matching estimators Bias-corrected Bias-corrected Bias-corrected Bias-corrected Bias-corrected Bias-corrected Bias-corrected Bias-corrected Bias-corrected 
ATT -0.0472** -0.0673** -0.0494* -0.0398* -0.0578* -0.0459* -0.0507** -0.0578* -0.0503* 
SE (0.0226) (0.0297) (0.0268) (0.0231) (0.0317) (0.0274) (0.0247) (0.0323) (0.0283) 
Z-statistics -2.09 -2.26 -1.84 -1.73 -1.82 -1.67 -2.06 -1.79 -1.78 
Observations 638 631 622 655 655 642 660 660 648 
Number of matches 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Common support condition [0.1,0.9] [0.1,0.9] [0.1,0.9] [0.0668,0.9909] [0.0781,0.9912] [0.1 0 15, 0.9896] No No No 
(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
Case Robustness: number ofmatches=1 Robustness: number ofmatches=8 Robustness: including year dummies 
Covariates Baseline Adding 1 variable Adding 3 variables Baseline Adding 1 variable Adding 3 variables Baseline Adding 1 variable Adding 3 variables 
Matching estimators Bias-corrected Bias-corrected Bias-corrected Bias-corrected Bias-corrected Bias-corrected Bias-corrected Bias-corrected Bias-corrected 
ATT -0.0587** -0.0651 ** -0.0662* -0.0425* -0.0656** -0.0458* -0.0584* -0.0709** -0.0453* 
SE (0.0276) (0.0318) (0.0380) (0.0246) (0.0308) (0.0261) (0.0305) (0.0298) (0.0257) 
Z-statistics -2.13 -2.05 -1.74 -1.73 -2.13 -1.75 -1.92 -2.38 -1.77 
Observations 638 631 622 638 631 622 612 610 603 
Number of matches 1 1 1 8 8 8 4 4 4 
Common support condition [0.1,0.9] [0.1,0.9] [0.1,0.9] [0.1,0.9] [0.1,0.9] [0.1,0.9] [0.1,0.9] [0.1,0.9] [0.1,0.9] 
Note: See Table 2. We refer to the observation with Regime 1 (i.e., consistent pegs) as the "treatment group" and to the observation with Regime 2 (i.e., "fear of announcing a peg") as the "control group." We estimate 
the average treatment effect of consistent pegs on the occurrence of currency crises using the dataset of de facto pegs. 
** Significant at the 5 % level. 
* Significant at the 10 % level. 
Table 4 
las-correc e BO t d mac m t h O f tOt t es Ima ors: consis en . pegs VSo f earo peggmg 
(I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Case Benchmark Robustness: adding variables Robustness: overlap condition of Becker and Ichino (2002) Robustness: no overlap condition 
Covariates Baseline Adding 1 variable Adding 3 variables Baseline Adding 1 variable Adding 3 variables Baseline Adding I variable Adding 3 variables 
Matching estimators Bias-corrected Bias-corrected Bias-corrected Bias-corrected Bias-corrected Bias-corrected Bias-corrected Bias-corrected Bias-corrected 
ATT -0.0798* -0.0918** -0.1028** -0.0826* -0.1742*** -0.2126*** -0.0815* -0.1721 *** -0.2125*** 
SE (0.0467) (0.0437) (0.0499) (0.0451) (0.0449) (0.0641) (0.0441) (0.0441) (0.0632) 
Z-statistics -1.71 -2.10 -2.06 -1.83 -3.88 -3.31 -1.85 -3.90 -3.36 
Observations 522 428 408 547 548 534 554 554 543 
Number of matches 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Common support condition [0.1,0.9] [0.1,0.9] [0.1,0.9] [0.1620,0.9970] [0.1164,0.9990] [0.1292, 0.9992] No No No 
(10) (11) (12) _ (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
Case Robustness: number ofmatches=1 Robustness: number ofmatches=8 Robustness: including year dummies 
Covariates Baseline Adding 1 variable Adding 3 variables Baseline Adding 1 variable Adding 3 variables Baseline Adding 1 variable Adding 3 variables 
Matching estimators Bias-corrected Bias-corrected Bias-corrected Bias-corrected Bias-corrected Bias-corrected Bias-corrected Bias-corrected Bias-corrected 
ATT 
-0.0868** -0.1062** -0.1341 *** -0.0756** -0.0786** -0.0971 ** -0.0939** -0.1216*** -0.1184*** 
SE (0.0381) (0.0441) (0.0446) (0.0379) (0.0382) (0.0404) (0.0400) (0.0373) (0.0395) 
Z-statistics -2.28 -2.41 -3.01 -1.99 -2.06 -2.40 -2.35 -3.26 -3.00 
Observations 522 428 408 522 428 408 425 400 372 
Number of matches I 1 1 8 8 8 4 4 4 
Common support condition [0.1,0.9] [0.1,0.9] [0.1,0.9] [0.1,0.9] [0.1,0.9] [0.1,0.9] [0.1,0.9] [0.1,0.9] [0.1,0.9] 
Note: See Table 2. We refer to the observation with Regime 1 (i.e., consistent pegs) as the "treatment group" and to the observation with Regime 3 (i.e., fear of pegging or inability of pegging) as the "control group." 
We estimate the average treatment effect of consistent pegs on the occurrence of currency crises using the dataset of de jure pegs. 
*** Significant at the 1 % level. 
** Significant at the 5 % level. 
* Significant at the 10 % level. 
Table 5 
las-correc e B' t d mac mg es Ima ors: consis en pegs VS, consis en oa S t h' f t 't t 't ttl t 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Case Benchmark Robustness: adding variables Robustness: overlap condition of Becker and !chino (2002) Robustness: no overlap condition 
Covariates Baseline Adding 1 variable Adding 3 variables Baseline Adding 1 variable Adding 3 variables Baseline Adding 1 variable Adding 3 variables 
Matching estimators Bias-corrected Bias-corrected Bias-corrected Bias-corrected Bias-corrected Bias-corrected Bias-corrected Bias-corrected Bias-corrected 
ATT -0.1178** -0.1472** -0.1433*** -0.1197** -0.1349** -0.1447*** -0.1206** -0.1412** -0.1465*** 
SE (0.0501) (0.0589) (0.0460) (0.0489) (0.0582) (0.0519) (0.0481) (0.0554) (0.0490) 
Z-statistics -2.35 -2.50 -3.12 -2.45 -2.32 -2.79 -2.51 -2.55 -2.99 
Observations 526 519 493 534 534 529 552 552 546 
Number of matches 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Common support condition [0.1,0.9] [0.1,0.9] [0.1,0.9] [0.1849,0.9938] [0.1903,0.9951] [0.1992,0.9954] No No No 
(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
Case Robustness: number ofmatches=1 Robustness: number ofmatches=8 Robustness: including year dummies 
Covariates Baseline Adding 1 variable Adding 3 variables Baseline Adding 1 variable Adding 3 variables Baseline Adding 1 variable Adding 3 variables 
Matching estimators Bias-corrected Bias-corrected Bias-corrected Bias-corrected Bias-corrected Bias-corrected Bias-corrected Bias-corrected Bias-corrected 
ATT -0.1649** -0.1937** -0.2046*** -0.1116*** -0.1426*** -0.1329*** -0.0784* -0.1024** -0.0897** 
SE (0.0752) (0.0817) (0.0786) (0.0433) (0.0496) (0.0422) (0.0435) (0.0431) (0.0418) 
Z-statistics -2.19 -2.37 -2.60 -2.58 -2.87 -3.15 -1.81 -2.38 -2.14 
Observations 526 519 493 526 519 493 421 421 415 
Number of matches 1 1 1 8 8 8 4 4 4 
Common support condition [0.1,0.9] [0.1,0.9] [0.1,0.9] [0.1,0.9] [0.1,0.9] [0.1,0.9] [0.1,0.9] [0.1,0.9] [0.1,0.9] 
Note: See Table 2. We refer to the observation with Regime 1 (Le., consistent pegs) as the "treatment group" and to the observation with Regime 4 (Le., consistent floats) as the "control group." We estimate the average 
treatment effect of consistent pegs on the occurrence of currency crises using the dataset of Regime 1 and Regime 4. 
*** Significant at the 1 % level. 
** Significant at the 5 % level. 
* Significant at the 10 % level. 
Appendix A 
Appendix Table A. Currency crises, 1980-1998 
Country 2-year window Country 2-year window Country 2-year window Country 2-year window 
Australia 81,85 Ecuador 82,86,88 Central African Republic 94 Swaziland 82,85 
Austria Egypt 81,89,91 Costa Rica 81 Syrian Arab Republic 82,88,91 
Belgium 82 India 88,90,93 Cyprus 95 Tanzania 86 
Canada Indonesia 82,86,97 Dominican Republic 85 Togo 94 
Denmark Jordan 88 EI Salvador 86,90 Tunisia 81,92 
Finland 92 Korea 97 Gabon 89,94 Uganda 83,85,87,89 
France 82 Malaysia 97 Ghana 83,87,90 Uruguay 82,84 
Greece 83,85 Mexico 82,85,94 Grenada Zambia 86,94 
Iceland 80,82 Morocco 81 Guatemala 86 Zimbabwe 91,97 
Ireland 86 Nigeria 82,86,92,94 Guyana 82,87,89,91 
Italy 92,95 Pakistan 82,96 Haiti 82 
Japan 89 Panama Honduras 90 
Netherlands Peru 87,90 Jamaica 83,91 
New Zealand 82,84 Philippines 84,97 Kenya 81,95,97 
Norway 92 Singapore 97 Lesotho 
Portugal 82 South Africa 84 Madagascar 81,87,94 
Spain 82,92 Sri Lanka 89,98 Malawi 82,92,94,98 
Sweden 82,89,92 Thailand 80,82,97 Mali 94 
Switzerland 81 Turkey 91,94 Malta 85,95 
United Kingdom 81,92 Venezuela 84,86,89,94 Mauritania 85,91 
Argentina 81,83,89,91 Algeria 90 Mauritius 81,83,92 
Brazil 83,90 Bolivia 81,83,85,88,90 Nepal 84,93 
Chile 82,85 Botswana 82,84 Niger 94 
China, P.R.: Hong Kong Burundi 83,88,98 Paraguay 84,86,89,92 
Colombia 83 Cameroon 84,94 Senegal 94 
Source: Esaka (2010). 
AppendixB 
Appendix Table B. Propensity score matching 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Treatment groups Regime 1 (consistent pegs) Regime 1 (consistent pegs) 
Control groups Other regimes Regime 2 (fear of announcing a peg) 
Matching methods Nearest neighbor Radius (r=0.01) Radius (r=O.05) Nearest neighbor Radius (r=0.01) Radius (r=0.05) 
ATT -0.063** -0.070*** -0.070*** -0.034 -0.052** -0.044* 
SE (0.027) (0.021) (0.021) (0.029) (0.025) (0.024) 
T-statistics -2.303 -3.247 -3.377 -1.157 -2.044 -1.787 
Treatment observations 415 409 415 415 404 411 
Matched control group observations 222 447 454 154 217 218 
Common support condition [0.l,0.9] [0.1,0.9] [0.l,0.9] [0.1,0.9] [0.1,0.9] [0.1,0.9] 
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Treatment groups Regime 1 (consistent pegs) Regime 1 (consistent pegs) 
Control groups Regime 3 (fear of pegging or inability of pegging) Regime 4 (consistent floats) 
Matching methods Nearest neighbor Radius (r=0.01) Radius (r=0.05) Nearest neighbor Radius (r=0.01) Radius (r=O.05) 
ATT -0.099* -0.1l4*** -0.119*** -0.l08** -0.076* -0.078* 
SE (0.058) (0.040) (0.039) (0.050) (0.045) (0.043) 
T -statistics -1.691 -2.853 -3.055 -2.l71 -1.686 -1. 799 
Treatment observations 415 388 407 415 396 415 
Matched control group observations 97 120 124 90 110 112 
Common support condition [0.1,0.9] [0.1,0.9] [0.l,0.9] [0.l,0.9] [0.1,0.9] [0.1,0.9] 
Note: In the first stage, we estimate the probability of adopting Regime 1 using multinomial probit models. The dependent variable is the index of exchange rate regimes. We use the same covanates (pre-treatment 
variables) as the benchmark of the bias-corrected matching estimators in Tables 2-5. In the second stage, we estimate the average treatment effect of Regime 1 on the frequency of currency crises by calculating the 
mean difference in outcomes between the treated and the control observations using propensity score matching. In this analysis, we employ nearest-neighbor and radius matching methods as propensity score matching 
methods. We employ two radius matching estimators: r=0.0 1 and r=0.05. The freely falling observations are excluded. Following Crump et al. (2009), we use the observations of the interval [0.1, 0.9] for the estimated 
propensity scores as the common support condition. ATT is the average treatment effect on treated. The numbers in parentheses are analytical standard errors of the treatment effect. 
*** Significant at the 1 % level. 
** Significant at the 5 % level. 
* Significant at the 10 % level. 
Figure 1 
De jure and de facto exchange rate regimes 
Exchange rate De facto classification (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004) 
regimes 1 2 3 
IMF classification Pegs Floats Freely falling 
Regime 1 Regime 3 
1 Pegs 
De jure pegs and de facto pegs De jure pegs and de facto floats 
Consistent pegs Fear of pegging or 
Inability of pegging Freely faIling 
High inflation 
Regime 2 Regime 4 
2 Floats 
De jure floats and de facto pegs De jure floats and de facto floats 
Fear of announcing a peg Consistent floats 
Sources: Levy-Yeyati and Sturzeneggar (2005), Genberg and Swoboda (2005), and Alesina and Wagner (2006). 
